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1 Introduction
Several experimental studies have documented strong empirical regularities in
linear public goods experiments including (1) the fact that people contribute
more than predicted by the standard theoretical prediction; and (2) that aver-
age contribution declines steadily over time when the game is repeated under
a ￿nite horizon.1 In contrast to the huge amount of literature concerned with
the puzzling fact that subjects over-contribute with respect to their Nash con-
tribution, the attempts made to explain the decline of the average contribution
observed in most linear public goods experiments are not clear-cut. These at-
tempts boil down to three major explanations : learning, strategic play and
other regarding preferences including reciprocity (conditionnal cooperation).
According to the learning hypothesis over-contributions in early rounds arise
because subjects are confused and make errors. As time elapses, and feedback
from past rounds becomes available, they realize that they could earn more by
over-contributing less, and adjust their current contribution accordingly. How-
ever, available evidence about learning suggests that it plays a limited role in
1See Ledyard (1995) for a review of this literature published prior to 1995; See also An-
dreoni, 1995; Croson, 1996; Gaechter & Fehr, 1999; Keser & van Winden, 2000; Fehr &
Gaechter, 2000; Masclet et al., 2003; Carpenter, 2007; Sefton, Shupp & Walker, 2007; Her-
man, Toeni & Gaechter, 2008.
1the decay. Neugebauer et al. (2009a) found that repetition without feedback
has no e⁄ect on average contribution which seems to suggest that there is no
learning by introspection. Decay arises only when information about the contri-
bution of group members is provided. In contrast, Houser & Kurzban found a
sharper decay when a subject plays against a computer program.2 Nevertheless,
the learning hypothesis seems incompatible with the ￿restart e⁄ect￿found by
Andreoni (1988).34
The second candidate explanation for the decay in average contribution is
reputation. The hypothesis of "strategic play" is based on the idea that players
take into account future interactions when choosing their current contribution.
Therefore, in early periods they have an incentive for establishing a cooperative
reputation, by making a large contribution. The justi￿cation of the strategic
hypothesis is based on the ￿crazy player￿ assumption (Kreps et al.,1982), or
equivalently on the lack of common knowledge of rationality. If (rational) players
believe that there is a crazy player in the group who contributes positively in
period 1, it becomes rational for them to play a trigger strategy in early periods
and to mix over the strategy space as the repeated game approaches the ￿nal
period.5 Andreoni (1988) o⁄ered the ￿rst test of the reputation hypothesis by
comparing the average contributions of partner groups with stranger groups.
Since there is no incentive to develop a cooperative reputation among strangers,
one should observe higher over-contributions in partner-groups than in stranger-
groups, especially in early periods of the repeated game. Surprisingly, Andreoni
(1988) found that strangers contribute more than partners, that the di⁄erence
2In their computerized treatment human subjects were told that the 3 other members of
their group where computerized players, which followed a predetermined contribution path.
The latter was chosen to be equal to 3
4 of the average contribution observed in the human
condition, and the computers￿current choice was announced at the beginning of each round.
Overcontribution did not vanish even after 10 rounds. Houser & Kurzban￿ s conclusion is that
more than 50% of the overcontribution is due do confusion.
3After having played 10 rounds of a linear public good game, Andreoni told his subjects
that a new sequence of 10 rounds will be played. Surprisingly, he observed that the average
contribution of the ￿rst restart period does not di⁄er from the average ￿rst period contribution
in the initial sequence.
4Anderson et al. (2004) developed a more sophisticated theory of learning based on quantal
response. Anderson et al. (2004) show that the dynamic process of individual contributions
follows the well-known Fokker-Planck equation and converges to the logit equilibrium distribu-
tion of contributions. Despite its mathematical elegance, the model has two limitations : ￿rst,
the model does not explain why contributions are sensitive to the remaining number of periods
as observed in partner sessions (due to the neglect of strategic interactions across periods),
and second, it assumes that subjects are able to best-respond to the stochastic distribution
of other players￿contributions by choosing a stochastic distribution over their strategy space,
which requires a high degree of sophistication for each player to form expectations about
other players￿choice probabilities. While the model nicely describes the patterns observed
in the data, "as if" subjects￿behaviour was of the QRE type, it is not very plausible from a
behavioural point of view.
5Strategic play is compatible with the fact that most subjects over-contribute in early
periods and switch to their Nash contribution at some later period (see e.g. Isaac et al.
(1994), Laury (1997), Keser & vanWinden (2000)). In early periods they signal a desire to
cooperate, but as the end of the game approaches their incentive to do so vanishes, and they
switch to their Nash contribution. The evidence that the decay is slower in longer games
(Isaac et al. 1994) is compatible with the strategic hypothesis.
2in average contribution increases over time, and that complete free-riding is
signi￿cantly more frequent in the partner treatment. These ￿ndings seem to
destroy the reputation hypothesis as a plausible explanation of the decay in
average contributions.6
Are other-regarding preferences potential explanations for the decline in con-
tributions? Altruism 7 can account for the fact that people contribute more than
their pure self-interested contribution, but cannot explain the decay in contri-
bution. A more plausible explanation is conditional cooperation, i.e. the fact
that people choose to cooperate, depending on previously observed decisions of
others or on beliefs about their decisions (e.g. Keser and van Winden, 2000;
Fischbacher, Gaechter and Fehr, 2001; Croson, 2007; Fischbacher & Gaechter,
2009). Up to recently, reciprocity theories tended to attribute the decay to
preference heterogeneity : reciprocal cooperative players are mixed with sel￿sh
agents who free-ride on others￿contributions. In a given period, a reciprocal
player who either observes that his contribution is above the average, or who
expects others to contribute less, will reduce his contribution, and therefore
the mean contribution declines. But heterogeneity per se is neither a necessary
nor a su¢ cient condition for the decline.8 Heterogeneity can either reinforce
or attenuate the tendency for the decline, but is not the central driving force
of the process. According to Fischbacher & Gaechter (2009) imperfect condi-
tional cooperation is the main driving force behind the decay : "Many people￿ s
desire to contribute less than others, rather than changing beliefs of what oth-
ers will contribute over time". The intuition behind this is that reciprocators
contribute a little less than the observed (or expected) average contribution.
Because of such "sticky beliefs" decay can arise even in a population composed
exclusively of non-sel￿sh agents. A population of identical non-sel￿sh agents,
but slightly sel￿shly oriented, is enough to provoke the decline. There is strong
6Note however that there is no clear evidence that stranger contribute signi￿cantly more
than partners. Indeed, several studies have also found the opposite, showing that partners
contribute signi￿cantly more than strangers (see for example Croson, 1996, Fehr & Gaechter,
2000; Masclet et al., 2003). However these studies also indicate that average contribution
under stranger matching condition still decline over time as the game is repeated, which
cannot be explained by the reputation hypothesis.
7One potential explanation relies on the idea that people cooperate because they "take
pleasure in others￿pleasure" (see e.g. Dawes and Thaler,1988). Theory of altruism presented
by Andreoni and Miller (1996) assumes that an altruistic player￿ s utility increases not only
in his own payo⁄ but also in the other players￿ payo⁄s. Two forms of altruism are gen-
erally given in the literature: ￿pure altruism￿ (individuals care about others￿ payo⁄s) and
￿ warm-glow￿altruism (individuals enjoy contributing per se). However, both pure and impure
altruistic motives cannot adequately describe the decline of contribution observed in public
goods experiments. Indeed why would altruistic motives vanish over time?
8To see why, let us de￿ne a perfect reciprocator as a player who matches the average
group contribution of the previous period. Consider a case involving only two players : a
perfectly reciprocal player and an unconditional player who contributes a ￿xed amount in
each period. As the game is repeated the contribution of the reciprocal player converges to
the ￿xed contribution of the unconditional player, with a slope that depends on the initial
contribution of the reciprocator. The example can be easily extended to any mixed population
of any ￿nite size composed of perfect reciprocators and unconditional players. Adding noisy
players who contribute a random amount does not prevent that the mean contribution either
decays or increases.
3experimental evidence for such imperfect reciprocity (Fischbacher & Gaechter,
2009, Fischbacher et al., 2001) or sel￿shly-biased reciprocity (Neugebauer et
al., 2009). A conclusion from this short litterature review is that imperfect
reciprocity is the main driving forces underlying the decay, while learning and
strategic behaviour reinforce this tendency.
In this paper, we propose a new model of behaviour, compatible with the
imperfect conditional cooperation hypothesis, that accounts for the decline of
average contribution. Precisely, it is based on the idea that agents choose their
contribution by relying on two dimensions : a ￿morally ideal contribution￿(see
Brekke et al., 2003, Nyborg, 2000) and the observed contributions of others.
The assumption that people rely on a morally ideal contribution is defended
by commitment theories (see e.g. Croson 2007). Based on Kantian reasoning,
these theories assume that individuals make "unconditional" commitments to
contribute to the public good. Our originality is to assume that for most people
such commitments are weak in the sense that they are sensitive to the observa-
tion of others￿actions. In a contribution context, individuals might therefore be
tempted to revise their preferred contribution after observing others￿contribu-
tions. The extent of such a revision typically varies across individuals : strongly
motivated agents will closely stick to their ideal contribution, while weakly mo-
tivated agents are prone to revise their morally ideal contribution whenever
they observe a gap between their own and others￿contributions. Our idea of
weakly morally motivated agents captures a large spectrum of contribution be-
haviours : at one extreme, unconditional contributors, who always stick to their
ideal contribution whatsover, and at the other extreme pure reciprocators who
always match the observed group contribution. Free-riding behaviour is a par-
ticular case of unconditional behaviour : always contributing zero in a linear
public good game whatever the other group members do. Our idea, is that most
people are of the "mixed" type, i.e. their actual contribution is the outcome
of a deliberative process through which their preferred contribution is balanced
against others￿observed average contribution.The assumption of weakly morally
motivated agents o⁄ers a possible justi￿cation for imperfect reciprocal behaviour
that we call action-based reciprocity : individuals￿ideal contribution is sensitive
to others￿observed contributions. Altenatively, individuals might also decide
about their contributions by relying on their expectations about others￿contri-
butions (belief-based reciprocity). However, such beliefs are themselves revised
according to observed contributions.
The model we propose is primarily designed to explain the decline of average
contributions in linear public goods experiments. However, it is also compatible
with several other stylized facts observed in experiments on voluntary contri-
butions to a public good. For linear public goods experiments these facts may
be summarized as follows : a) subjects contribute half of their endowment in
the ￿rst period, b) the average contribution tends to decline as the game is
repeated, c) there is signi￿cant over-contribution in the ￿nal period, d) there
is high variance of individual contributions, e) most subjects adjust their con-
tribution from one period to the next. Similar observations have been made
for interior Nash equilibria and for interior dominant strategy equilibria, except
4that stylized fact a) should be understood as ￿subjects contribute mid way be-
tween the equilibrium contribution and the socially optimum contribution￿(see
Sefton & Steinberg, 1996, Laury & Holt, 1998). Although we are mainly con-
cerned with facts b) and e), our model is also compatible with facts a), c) and d).
Closely linked to our idea, the paper by Kandori (2002) models erosion of norms
and morale, to explain various social phenomena including the decay in volun-
tary contributions. Two recent papers (Ambrus and Pathak, 2007, Klumpp,
2005) propose a dynamic model of voluntary contributions which accounts for
the decline. We compare the ￿ndings of these papers to our own proposal in the
discussion section.
Section 2 introduces our concept of weak moral motivation and shows its
implications for the dynamics of average contributions in a simple linear public
good model with myopic agents. Section 3 extends the results to non-linear
utility and section 4 to non-myopic agents. Our assumptions and results are
discussed in section 5 and contrasted with other models. Section 6 concludes.
2 Weak moral motivation and voluntary contri-
butions
Consider n agents, indexed i = 1;:::;n; who can contribute voluntarily to a
public good. Each of them has an endowment wi, which he can split between
his contribution to the public good, xi, and the consumption of private goods,
wi ￿ xi. Using the notation x￿i =
P
j6=i xj, the cardinal representation of
agents￿preferences with moral motivation is :
Ui (xi;x￿i; b xi) = wi ￿ xi + ￿i (xi + x￿i) ￿ vi (xi ￿ b xi) : i = 1;:::;n; (1)
where ￿i 2 ]0;1[ is the marginal utility from consuming G = xi+x￿i; the public
good9.
Agent i￿ s moral motivation is embodied in the function vi(:), where b xi stands
for his moral obligation. Her loss of utility attached to any deviation from her
moral obligation is vi (xi ￿ b xi). This function is assumed to be convex. In
addition two natural assumptions about vi (:) are as follows:
assumption 2 vi (0) = 0; vi (xi ￿ b xi) > 0 i⁄ xi 6= b xi :
9The results of the present paper also hold when preferences are captured by quadratic
utility functions:
Ui (xit;x￿it; b xit) = ￿i (w ￿ xit) ￿ (wi ￿ xit)2 + ￿i (xit + x￿it) ￿
vi
2
(xit ￿ b xit)2 :
This family of functions, which allows for a dominant strategy equilibrium with strictly positive
contributions, has been documented in the experimental literature by relatively few papers
(Keser, 1996, Bracht et alii, 2008).
5assumption 3 v0
i (:) R 0 , xi ￿ b xi R 0
The ￿rst assumption is obvious. The second assumption means that, starting
from a situation where agent i contributes less (more) than her moral obligation,
a marginal increase of xi reduces (increases) her loss of utility.
We shall conceptualize the weak moral motivation of each agent as a com-
bination of two logics : an autonomous logic and the logic of social in￿ uence.
The autonomous logic is captured by an ideal, or "ethical", level of contribution
noted x￿
i ￿ 0. For instance, it could correspond to a Pareto optimal level of
contributions, i.e. contributing wi for each i. Such autonomous logic can be
grounded on a Kantian Categorical Imperative, or on an unconditional commit-
ment to a contribution (La⁄ont 1975, Harsanyi 1980). The initial contribution
is therefore independent of the expected contributions of other players. The sec-
ond logic captures social in￿ uences via the average contribution observed in the
immediate past, xt￿1 ￿ 0. The group contribution is publicly observed after
each period. Each player can therefore compare his contribution to the aver-
age group contribution. Discovering that her own contribution di⁄ers from the
group contribution eventually leads her to revise her previous contribution. For
example a player who discovers that he has contributed more (less) than the
average might decrease (increase) his current contribution. In our model such
adjustments towards the previously observed mean contribution are grounded
on the revision of agents￿moral motivation.





i; t = 0;
Mi (x￿
i;xt￿1); t = 1;2;:::
where function Mi(:;:) is discontinuous at t = 0, for there is no previous ob-
servations at that date that could be used to qualify the autonomous ethical
level.
The moral obligation function satis￿es the intuitive properties:








assumption 5 A4: xmin
it = min(x￿




Also, it is assumed that the aggregate quali￿ed moral obligation is bounded







i = G￿ ; 8a ￿ 0:
6Because of Assumption (A4), hereafter Mi (x￿
i;a) is refered to as a weak
moral motivation. Assumption (A5) plays a key role for the dynamics of contri-
butions in the linear public good￿ s game, as in (1). According to this assumption
aggregate contributions cannot exceed the aggregate initial moral motivation.
For instance, if x￿
i = wi for all i, actual contributions are necessarily bounded
by aggregate endowment. In a more general sense, assumption (A5) means
that players￿moral motivation is not grounded on utopia but on realism and
feasibility. However, while (A5) holds in aggregate, it needs not be true at indi-
vidual levels, i:e: Mi (x￿
i;a) > x￿
i for some i and some a is a possibility. Based
on the previous argument it might also be reasonable to assume that x￿
i ￿ wi,
although we do not require this stronger assumption. Although (A5) is a neces-
sary assumption for the decay in linear public good￿ s games, we show in section
5, that this assumption is not needed in the case on non-linear utility functions.
Example 7 An illustration of a weak moral motivation function is the follow-
ing:
b xit = (1 ￿ ￿i)x￿
i + ￿ixt￿1 ; ￿i 2 [0;1] ;
= x￿
i ￿ ￿i (x￿
i ￿ xt￿1) :
The weight 1 ￿ ￿i may be interpreted as the "strength" of agent i￿ s moral mo-
tivation. If ￿i = 0 agent i has as strong moral motivation : he never deviates
from his ideal contribution, whatever the observed average contribution by other
members of his group. On the other hand, an agent for whom ￿i is close to
1 will strongly revise her initial moral ideal, whenever her current contribution
di⁄ers from the average group contribution. Assuming the above revision rule,
a purely reciprocal player can be de￿ned as a player for whom ￿i = 1, while a
unconditional free-rider is de￿ned by ￿i = 0 and x￿
i = 0:
If the contribution game is played only once, player i has a dominant strategy
to contribute less than his moral motivation. He chooses xi to solve :
max
xi;t
wi ￿ xi + ￿i (xi + x￿i) ￿ vi (xi ￿ x￿
i):
The ￿rst order condition gives :
￿1 + ￿i = v0
i (xi ￿ x￿
i)
At equilibrium the agent equalizes the marginal material cost of a contri-
bution (￿i ￿ 1) to the marginal moral cost of a deviation from her moral ideal
(v0
i (xi ￿ x￿





￿1 (￿i ￿ 1)
Since ￿i < 1, (v0
i)
￿1 (￿i ￿ 1) < 0.
7While our de￿nition of weak moral motivation is related to a player￿ s sen-
sitivity to social in￿ uence, the above result shows that there is also a "private
component" of the weak moral motivation. The latter can be thought as the
temptation to deviate from the moral ideal, in order to increase one￿ s material
utility. Indeed the individual chooses her optimum level of contribution by equal-
izing the marginal material cost of a contribution to the marginal moral cost of
deviating from the moral ideal. As we shall see below, this sel￿sh bias towards
the material payo⁄ plays also a role in the decay of average contributions.
3 Repeated play with myopic players
Assume now that the contribution game is played a ￿nite number of periods.
We assume that in each period players rely on their current updated moral
motivation, which is determined by the observed average contribution of the
previous period. A key assumption for this section, is that players do not take
into account their in￿ uence on other players￿ future moral motivation when
choosing their contribution. We de￿ne therefore, for each period of time, a
Myopic Nash Equilibrium (MNE)10 as a pro￿le of contributions such that each




wi ￿ xit + ￿i (xit + x￿it) ￿ vi (xit ￿ b xit):
From the ￿rst order conditions, interior decisions solve:
￿1 + ￿i = v0
i (xit ￿ b xit) ; 8i;8t;
thus individual equilibrium contributions at period t are:
xit = Mi (x￿
i;xt￿1) + (v0
i)
￿1 (￿i ￿ 1) ; 8i :
The revision rule for the moral motivation naturally leads to an interpre-
tation of action-based contributions: current period contributions are partly
determined by past observed contributions and partly by individuals￿ moral
motivation. The revision rule can be easily adapted to capture belief-based reci-
procity. If we substitute "others￿average contribution in the previous period"
by the "expectation about others￿contributions". The revision rule becomes
b xit = Mi (x￿
i;xe
it);where xe
it is agent i￿ s expectation of the average contribution
of other players for period t. The interpretation is now that agent i deter-
mines her current contribution by taking into account her expectation about
the (current) contribution of other players and her initial moral motivation.
The two formulations do not fundamentally di⁄er if we assume that individu-
als￿expectations are positively related to their observed contributions of other
group members, i.e. if xe
it = f(xit￿1), with f0(:) > 0. With this assumption we
restrict our interpretation to action-based reciprocity.
10This concept is not ours. In particular it has been used extensively in the literature on
processes (see DrŁze and De la VallØe Poussin, 1977, for instance).
8Proposition 8 At a MNE, the level of public good is non increasing over time.
If Assumption A5 is veri￿ed with a strict inequality, then the level of public good
is strictly decreasing over time.



































i by Assumption A5.
Assume the property Gt < Gt￿1 holds for t = 3;:::;k; for some k. To com-
plete the proof, it must be established that Gk+1 < Gk This is straightforward,
























￿1 (￿i ￿ 1);
because each Mi(:;:) is an increasing function of its second argument and this
argument has fallen, Gk < Gk￿1.


















￿1 (￿i ￿ 1): (2)
The dynamic process in (2) can eventually reach a level of contribution equal
to zero, the free-riding equilibrium in standard linear public good￿ s games. The
huge amount of experimental data on voluntary contributions suggests however,
that even in the ￿nal period, subjects tend to overcontribute signi￿cantly. To
account for such overcontribution in our framework two additional assumptions
are required : the ￿rst one stipulates that an increase of the previous level of
public good has a less than proportional positive e⁄ect on the levels of weak
moral motivations:
assumption 9 A6: Mi
2 ￿ 1:
The second requires the moral motivation to be strong enough to induce a
positive level of public good at a MNE even if the previous observable level was








￿1 (￿i ￿ 1):
Theorem 11 Under Assumptions A5, A6 and A7, the sequence of public good
levels converges to a unique positive interior level G1 2 ]0;G￿[.
9Proof. Under Assumption A6, the right hand side of the dynamics (2) is a
contraction. Therefore, according to Banach￿ s ￿xed point theorem : i) the
dynamics (2) has a unique steady state, ii) the sequence converges towards
this steady state. Assumptions A5 and A6 respectively discard the zero and full
contributions corner stationary points.
Proposition 12 Under Assumption A6, the higher the autonomous ethical level
x￿
i, the higher the long run level of public good G1.
















￿1 (￿i ￿ 1): (3)













Proposition 13 The higher the marginal utility of the public good ￿i, the higher
the long run level of public good G1.








since vi(:) is a convex function.
4 Forward-looking players
In this section we relax the assumption of myopic behaviour in order to inves-
tigate how forward looking behaviour a⁄ects the dynamics of average contri-
bution. Forward looking players take into account the impact of their current
contribution on other players￿revised moral motivation in future periods, and
are aware that other players try to in￿ uence their own moral motivation. Such
mutual in￿ uence, might eventually lead to an increase in average contributions.
We show however, that under reasonable assumptions, the average contribution
declines over time.
Let T be the number periods during which agents interacts and 0 < ￿ ￿ 1
their common discount factor. We de￿ne players￿intertemporal utility as :
T X
t=0
￿tUi (xit;x￿it; b xit) ; i = 1;:::;n;
where
10￿ Ui (xit;x￿it; b xit) = wi￿xit+￿ (xit + x￿it)￿vi (xit ￿ b xit); where vi (xit ￿ b xit) =
vi
2 (xit ￿ b xit)
2 ; vi a positive scalar,
￿ b xit = (1 ￿ ￿i)x￿
i + ￿ixt￿1 = Mi (x￿
i;xt￿1); ￿i 2 [0;1] :
We will consider a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) for this dynamic public




wi ￿ xiT + ￿i (xiT + x￿iT) ￿ vi
￿




He has a dominant strategy, con￿gured by the average contribution inherited





i;xT￿1) ￿ giT (xT￿1):
It is worth noting that
g0
iT = Mi
2 (:;:) = ￿i: (4)
Those equilibrium strategies can be plugged back into the last period utility,
giving each agent￿ s value function for the last period:
V i













wi ￿ xiT￿1 + ￿i (xiT￿1 + x￿iT￿1) ￿ vi
￿










The optimal xiT￿1 cancels out the addition of several marginal e⁄ects:
i) as when agents are myopic, in the current period:
￿1 + ￿i ￿ v0
i
￿




ii) but unlike the case of myopic agents, there is also a marginal e⁄ect on the
next period ￿ @
xiT￿1V i


























































11This second marginal e⁄ect explains the di⁄erence between the myopic and
farsighted behaviors. Note that this di⁄erence owes nothing to the next period
deviation from the moral motivation. Indeed, a marginal increase of xiT￿1
has an impact on the next period moral motivation equal to ￿idxiT￿1 but
this increase is exactly o⁄set by the next period optimal contribution, as no-
ticed from (4), leaving the gap xiT ￿ Mi (x￿
i;xT￿1) unchanged. The di⁄er-








Overall, the ￿rst order conditions are:
￿1 + ￿ ￿ v0
i
￿












5 = 0 :













5 + Mi (x￿
i;xT￿2) ;




2 (:;:) = ￿i:
Each agent￿ s value function for the before last period is then:
V i

























Recursively it is possible to construct the agents￿value functions for each date.
There is no conceptual di¢ culty in this exercise but it is tedious and relegated
to the Appendix. The important piece of information is that the individual




wi ￿ xiT￿t + ￿i (xiT￿t + x￿iT￿t) ￿ vi
￿










And, using the notation ￿ = ￿
n
Pn
h=1 ￿h = ￿￿ < 1; the dominant strategy t
















￿h + Mi (x￿
i;xT￿t￿1); (5)
￿ giT￿t (xT￿t￿1) :




















We are now in a position to investigate whether those contributions could






















Those two conditions are met for instance when agents value su¢ ciently
the public good (￿ is large enough) and discount heavily the future (￿ small
enough). We can then establish:
Theorem 15 Under assumption A8, the MPE is characterized by non increas-
ing contributions over time.
Proof. Observe ￿rst that xi0 ￿ x￿
i 8i; by the ￿rst inequality in Assumption
A8, hence Mi (x￿
i;x0) ￿ x￿
i 8i: Then, we also have:
















since, by the second inequality in A8 the ￿rst term in the right hand side of the
above expression is positive and, as seen above x￿
i ￿Mi (x￿
i;x0) ￿ 0: Repeating
the comparison of successive contributions, one immediately sees that xit is non
increasing over time.


















Similarly, considering that period t is the ￿rst one, and letting the time


















￿ gi (xt￿1) ; 8i:
13Clearly, under Assumption A8; the property of non increasing contributions
carries over to the case of an in￿nite horizon.
A last question is in order: could this logic of behaviors explains the so-
called restart e⁄ect? The restart e⁄ect can be understood in two related yet
distinct ways. In the formalism of our model, when the condition of declining
contributions is met, one would speak of a restart e⁄ect in either of the two
following situations:
1. say that the duration of the game is ￿rst announced to be of T=2 periods,
then at date T=2 ￿ 1 there is a surprise restart announcement, according
to which agents will play a further T=2 periods after date T=2. there




; are larger than the contributions at the same date
without the announcement, xi T
2 .
2. imagine now that the announcement is made at date T=2; there is a restart
e⁄ect if the the contributions at date T=2 + 1 with the restart annouce-
ment, x0
i T
2 +1 ; are larger than the contributions at date T=2 without the
announcement, xi T
2 .
Let us investigate each possibility in turn. Without the surprise restart





















With the restart annoucement made at date T=2 ￿ 1, agents treat the problem











; so their contribution in the next period of this new


























Comparing the contributions of the two scenarios at period T=2; one ￿nds:
x0
i T















where the positive sign of the right-hand side is guaranted from the second
inequality in Assumption A8: So,
Proposition 16 A restart e⁄ect of the ￿rst kind occurs under Assumption A8.
14As for the second kind of restart e⁄ect, notice that the contributions in
period T=2 + 1, after the announcement at date T=2, are going to be:
x0
i T























Next consider the di⁄erence:
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￿h > x T
2 ￿1 ￿ x T
2 :
Observe that, under Assumption A8; the right hand side of the above inequality
is positive (because contributions are decreasing) and bounded. Indeed, the
average contributions necessarily fall in the interval [0;wi]; therefore 0 ￿ x T
2 ￿1￿
x T
2 ￿ wi : By contrast, if vi approaches zero, the left hand side of the inequality
tends to in￿nity. Thus:
Proposition 17 Under Assumption A8; there exists values of parameters vi of
the weak moral motivation functions such that a restart e⁄ect of the second kind
occurs.
5 Discussion
In our model the decline of average contributions is driven by two forces. The
￿rst one is due to the fact that each agent contributes a little less than his moral
ideal because he matches his marginal psychological cost of a deviation from his
moral ideal, to his marginal material cost of a contribution. The second is the
social in￿ uence which leads to a revision of his moral ideal. While the ￿rst force
always a⁄ects negatively his contribution, social in￿ uence can have a positive or
a negative e⁄ect on an agent￿ s moral motivation. However, positive e⁄ects arise
15only temporally, because even agents who revise upwards their moral motivation
end up reducing their contribution when they hit their budget constraint.
Our model allows for heterogeneity in players￿endowment, preferences, and
moral ideal. It therefore encompasses a huge variety of individual behaviours. It
predicts most of the observed experimental regularities : over-contritutions, het-
erogeneity of contributions, declining average contributions, ￿nal over-contributions
and the restart e⁄ect. However, it leaves open one important question : do sub-
jects have an initial moral motivation to contribute ? Before discussing this
issue, we compare brie￿ y our model to other attempts to model the decline.
Close to our proposal are the papers by Klumpp (2005) and Ambrus & Pathak
(2007)
Ambrus & Pathak (2007) consider a mixed population of players, which con-
sists of sel￿sh and reciprocal types. While the sel￿sh players have homogenous
preferences, there is heterogeneity among reciprocal types, which is captured by
reciprocity functions. The dynamics of the model is generated by the behaviour
of sel￿sh players who have an incentive to contribute large amounts in early
periods because of their in￿ uence on future contributions of reciprocal types.
The cooperative incentive of sel￿sh players depends on the number of remaining
periods in the repeated game. As the end of the game nears, the sel￿sh players
switch to their Nash contribution of the one-shot game, i.e. zero contribution.
The authors assume a continuous strategy space (players can contribute any
real number between 0 and 1). But the key assumption for the decline is com-
mon knowlege of preferences of all players, in particular reciprocity functions
are common knowledge. Although such an assumption can have some realism in
a population of players who know each other well and have experienced frequent
interactions over a long period, it does not apply to most experimental data,
where subjects are anonymous and interact only for a few periods. Furthermore,
the decay in average contribution is obtained by a decline in individual contribu-
tions for both types. This requirement seems uncesserarily strong, and does not
match individual behaviour in voluntary contribution experiments. The exper-
imental data reveals a high variability of individual contributions from period
to period (see e.g. Keser & Van Winden, 2000), which is typically not captured
in their model. In contrast, our model allows both for increasing and decreasing
individual contributions, with the weaker requirement that aggregate contribu-
tions cannot be larger than the initial aggregate moral motivation.
In Klumpp (2005) players are endowed with social preferences. Their util-
ity representation has two additively separable components : material utility
and psychological utility. The stage game admits therefore two symmetric Nash
equilibria : one where no player contributes to the public good, and one where
each player contributes a strictly positive amount. While the dynamic game ad-
mits multiple Nash equilibria, the author shows that there is a unique maximal
symmetric pure strategies equilibrium path, for which individual contributions
decline. As in Ambrus & Pathak (2007) this requirement is too strong for gener-
ating a decline in average contributions, and does not correspond to most avail-
able data. More important however, is that the temporal pro￿le of the maximal
equilibrium path is not compatible with the pattern typically observed in most
16experiments on voluntary contributions to a linear public good. In Klumpp￿ s
model, the maximal equilibrium path is one where all players contribute all of
their endowent up to some date, after which they start lowering their contribu-
tion down to a level that is approximately equal to zero. In contrast, average
contributions in linear public goods start at a level that is sandwiched between
half the endowment and the Nash contribution (see Laury & Holt, 2008) and
then declines slowly to reach a positive level that is signi￿cantly larger than the
Nash contribution of the constituent game. In Klumpp￿ s model the average con-
tribution falls very sharply from 100% contribution to nearly 0% contribution
over a few periods.
The conclusion of our discussion is that the models proposed by Ambrus &
Pathak (2007) and by Klumpp (2005) rely on unecessarily strong assumptions to
generate the decay of the average contribution. Our aim, in this paper was to give
a rationale for the decline, based on a reasonable behavioural hypothesis, and
accounting for most of the empirical regularities observed in the experimental
litterature.
6 Conclusion
Our aim in this paper was to provide a general framework that accounts for the
decay of the average contribution observed in most experiments on voluntary
contributions to a public good. The central idea of our model, is that people
rely on two dimensions for taking their contribution decision : a judgement
about what is the right contribution, which we called "moral ideal", and the
observation of others￿contributions. We de￿ned the combination of these two
forces as "weak moral motivation". The decline is generated by two e⁄ects, that
eventually can be in con￿ ict. The ￿rst one is a sel￿sh-bias with respect to the
morally ideal contribution. Each player balances her material utility loss from
contributing with her psychological utility loss of deviating from her moral ideal.
The unambiguous outcome is that each player contributes a little less than her
moral ideal. The second - and most important - e⁄ect is that an individual￿ s
moral ideal is in￿ uenced by the observation of others￿contributions. This e⁄ect
either increases or decreases the individual￿ s revised ideal contribution. For ex-
ample, an individual who observes that his group partners contribute less than
himself, will eventually revise downwards her initial moral ideal.
We started by showing that if players behave myopically, i.e. they do not
take into account the in￿ uence of their contribution on others￿moral motivation,
the average contribution is non-increasing as the contribution game is repeated.
The stronger result that the average contribution decays is grounded on the
crucial assumption that the revised aggregate moral ideal cannot exceed the
initial aggregate moral ideal (assumption A5). We ackwnowledge that at ￿rst
glance assumption A5 might be considered as a rather strong assumption, but
17there are two justi￿cations for this choice. First, the assumption is necessarily
satis￿ed in period 1, since the sel￿sh bias curbs downwards each individual￿ s
contribution with respect to her initial ideal contribution. Of course, this fact
does not preclude that some players adjust their moral ideal upwards. Assump-
tion A5 can therefore be thought in the following way : downwards adjuste-
ments by high-motivated agents always loom larger than upwards adjustement
by low-motivated agents. Second, and more generally, it is reasonable to set as
an upper limit to the agregate moral ideal. Budget constraints are on obvious
reason. But more importantly, the fact that group interactions occurs only over
a ￿nite number of periods, sets a natural upper boundary on individual revised
moral ideals, whenever these are in￿ uenced by social interactions.
The hypothesis of myopic behaviour seems to us as the most appealing with
respect to the experimental data about subjects￿behavior. However, we can-
not preclude the fact that some subjects act as farsighted players and try to
manipulate others￿moral motivation. Therefore, we provided an extension of
our basic model, to account for the more general case of farsighted players. As-
suming farsigthed behaviour, whe showed that the decline arises if agents value
su¢ ciently the public good (￿ is large enough) and discount heavily the future
(￿ small enough). The requirement, that under farsighted behaviour the dis-
count rate must be small with respect to the value of the public good, justi￿es
our preference for the simpler assumption of myopic behaviour for accounting
for the decline.
Our behavioural model captures two di⁄erent motivations for above-Nash
contributions and for declining average contributions : reciprocity and moral
motivation. While the reciprocity motive has been widely documented in the
recent theoretical and empirical economic litterature, the moral motivation hy-
pothesis has not retained much attention in the economic litterature. There is
a large historical trend in the philosophical litterature concerned with moral
motivation and the stength of will, that is relevant for our assumptions. In our
model there is a strong link between these two dimensions. The reason is that
reciprocal behaviour is somehow grounded on an internal deliberation process,
through which individuals combine their intrinsic motivation to contribute with
external pressures in their environment. The hypothesis of weak moral moral can
therefore be thought as a means to rationalize reciprocal behaviour. We believe
that such hypothesis can be tested with a carefully designed experiment.
Appendix
18A Derivation of the Markov Perfect Equilibrium
In the text, equilibrium decisions for periods T and T ￿ 1 have been given.




wi ￿ xiT￿2 + ￿i (xiT￿2 + x￿iT￿2) ￿ vi
￿











The marginal e⁄ects of changing xiT￿2 are now as follows:
i) As before there are e⁄ects on the current utility:
￿1 + ￿i ￿ v0
i
￿




ii) there are also marginal e⁄ects on the discounted indirect utility of period



















































































































































￿ giT￿2 (xT￿3) :
19The marginal e⁄ects of changing xiT￿3 are now as follows:
i) the e⁄ects on the current utility are:
￿1 + ￿i ￿ v0
i
￿




ii) there are also marginal e⁄ects on the discounted indirect utility of period



























































































































































































5 = 0 :




























5 + Mi (x￿
i;xT￿4) ;
￿ giT￿2 (xT￿3) :
Repeating the logic, and using the notation ￿ = ￿
n
Pn
h=1 ￿h; the dominant

































￿h + Mi (x￿
i;xT￿t￿1) ;
￿ giT￿t (xT￿t￿1) :
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